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ABSTRACT 
This analysis shows that there could be net gains to the U.S.  wheat 
industry if all U.S.  export wheat were to be cleaned to a  dockage 
level  between  0.35  to  0.40  percent.  These  results  are  based  on 
survey  results  of  major  importers  of  U.S.  wheat,  and  a  model  of 
world wheat trade.  Larger benefits to the U.S.  wheat industry would 
be  possible  from  cleaning  only  wheat  destined  to  countries  that 
demand  higher quality U.S.  wheat.  However,  these gains  in export 
revenue  from  selling  cleaner  wheat  could  be  offset  if  other 
exporters, especially Canada,  responded in ways that would maintain 
their market share. 
Keywords:  wheat,  grain quality,  trade model 
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ON  U.S.  WHEAT  EXPORTS 
On  average,  the United States exports about  55  percent of its 
wheat  crop and  supplies roughly  40  percent of the wheat traded on 
the world market.  Even  though the United states is the world's 
largest wheat exporter,  it faces stiff competition  from  a  number 
of other wheat  exporters that use  a  variety of policy tools, 
locational advantages  and quality difference to promote the sales 
of their grain on world markets.  Much  attention has  been  focused 
on the agricultural  and trade policies of competing wheat 
exporting countries and the effects on world trade.  The united 
States,  itself,  has relied heavily on targeted export subsidies 
through the Export Enhancement  Program  (EEP)  and credit subsidies 
to maintain or expand its share in many  markets.  Almost  ignored 
in the controversy surrounding the discussion of export 
restitutions,  EEP,  and price discrimination by marketing boards 
is the growing  importance of quality as  a  source of competition. 
This report discusses the  increasing importance of quality as  a 
source of competition among  wheat exporters,  and  examines  in more 
detail wheat cleanliness as  an  important component  of wheat 
quality  increasingly demanded  by  importers.  Using  a  world wheat 
model  that incorporates  importers'  demands  for diverse wheat 
characteristics,  this report calculates the net benefit of 
cleaning U.S.  export wheat to levels comparable to that of export 
competitors,  that is,  Canada  and Australia,  who  currently provide 
the cleanest wheat to their import customers.  As  explained below, 
this report builds on  a  project recently completed by  the 
Economic  Research Service  (ERS)  that examined many  of the same 
wheat cleaning issues. 
The  next section discusses grain quality and the role of 
cleanliness as  quality-determining characteristic.  The  second 
section discusses the ERS  study and  summarizes results that are 
explicitly used  in this report for further analysis.  The third 
section describes  a  theoretical model  of wheat  import demand,  and 
the fourth section describes  how  the theory is operationalized 
into a  computable partial equilibrium model  of world wheat trade 
that incorporates much  of the information and analysis provided 
by the ERS  study.  The  fifth section presents results,  and the 
sixth section summarizes major conclusions. 
The  Growing  Importance of Grain Quality 
Quality concerns of importers have had little effect on the 
overall U.S.  share of the world market,  although they have 
occasionally been very significant in some  country markets. 
These concerns  are becoming more  important,  however,  as 
1 liberalization of grain markets,  already under way,  are changing 
the basis of competition  in world grain markets. 
Wheat  market liberalization comes  from  two  sources.  The  first 
source is the elimination and/or relaxation of state trading 
regimes.  The  Philippines,  Brazil and  South Korea  have eliminated 
their state trading agencies  in the past 8  years  and  a  number  of 
other countries,  including Russia,  Pakistan,  Taiwan,  Morocco  and 
Japan,  have  made  or contemplated major changes  in their import 
regimes  in the past year.  Millers and  those responsible for 
importing wheat  in state-controlled systems typically do  not 
share the  same  objective concerning the quality of the  imported 
wheat.  To millers,  wheat quality factors  such as cleanliness, 
protein levels,  gluten  consi~tency,  etc.  usually rank in 
importance along side price.  state traders,  on the other hand, 
are not likely to value quality as much  as millers.  state trade 
officials must typically balance millers'  interests against 
constraints that may  include conserving foreign  exchange  and 
foreign policy concerns. 
The  second source of liberalization is the potential  for the 
elimination or reduction of export subsidy programs  including EEP 
and  GSM-I02  payments  over the next  5  or 10  years as part of  a 
comprehensive trade liberalization agreement.  without these 
powerful  financial  incentives,  the united states would  have to 
place greater emphasis  on the  fundamental  advantages of its grain 
marketing system and address the quality demands  of its foreign 
customers. 
Two  of the major competing suppliers,  Canada  and Australia,  have 
marketing boards which act as exclusive agents  for their 
producers.  As  the sole buyers of wheat  for export in their 
respective countries,  they can mandate quality purchase standards 
to their producers.  Grain boards pay producers  from their total 
receipts for the year after all operating costs are deducted. 
Thus,  the grain board passes along the full costs of its 
transactions.  These boards  have the capability of cutting the 
price to some  buyers while charging high prices to others.  They 
can settle a  dispute quickly by  compensating the buyer and 
passing the costs along to producers. 
For the united States,  the question of how to address the growing 
quality demands  of  importers is very complex.  The united states 
produces  and exports  5  major classes of wheat  including hard red 
winter  (HRW),  hard red spring  (HRS),  soft red winter  (SRW), 
western white  (WW)  and  durum.  The  strength of u.s. 
competitiveness is a  well-developed transportation and storage 
system which  can ship large volumes  of  a  variety of wheat classes 
to any part of the world at any time of the year.  Quality 
control  for u.s.  exports rests primarily with the buyer and 
seller.  The  Federal Grain Inspection Service  (FGIS)  acts mainly 
as  an official information source at the time of export.  It 
2 sets grain standards  for export and  inspects all shipments to 
determine if they meet contract specifications at loading,  but 
does  not place any  requirements  on what  a  willing buyer and  a 
willing seller can  exchange. 
Federal  Grades  and  Standards 
There has been much  debate over the role of the federal 
government  in setting grades  and standards  for grain.  Traders 
have generally argued  for minimal  government  involvement  (Hill, 
1990).  In their view,  the objective of grain grades is solely to 
facilitate orderly marketing of grain.  By  describing the 
physical  and  biolo~ical characteristics,  grades help traders 
group all grain into uniform lots for efficient entry into 
marketing channels.  Traders are less concerned over the factors 
that define standards than they are over the disruption in 
marketing that would result in switching to another set of 
factors. 1  Implicit in their arguments  is the notion that foreign 
purchasers can always  contract directly with the trader for 
quality characteristics that they demand.  The  problem,  as 
perceived by traders,  is that foreign  customers typically are not 
willing to pay appropriate price premiums  corresponding to the 
set of quality factors they desire. 
Producers  and  others have  argued  for  a  more  active government 
presence.  In their view,  grades  and  standards should serve as  a 
source of  information on  end-use value  and storage 
characteristics.  Grades  and  standards  lower the transactions 
costs of arranging sales between buyers  and sellers.  A  lack of 
standardized information reflecting the value of the grain  for 
its end use  in current grades  leads to marketing inefficiencies 
that underlie  foreign complaints about the quality of u.s.  grain. 
Although buyers  and sellers can theoretically negotiate premiums 
on quality characteristics,  the cost of deviating  from  currently 
defined grades  and  standards is,  in general,  too high for the 
typical  importer to make.  Thus,  producer groups believe that 
much  of the  impetus  for  improving quality must  come  from  changes 
in Federal grades  and  standards or,  at the very least,  from 
mandated reporting of quality characteristics not  now  included in 
the grades and  standards. 
No  one  expects  a  change  in grades and  standards to be  a  panacea. 
Wheat  quality at export is affected by weather conditions, 
varieties planted,  and  farming practices as well as the condition 
of facilities and practices for storing and transporting grain. 
A  change  in grades will,  at best,  help establish incentives in 
lThey are also concerned that grades and standards may require 
testing which will slow up the loading and certification of grades. 
3 the marketing  and production system to encourage higher quality 
standards;  it will not insure that quality premiums  which buyers 
may  be willing to pay will be sufficient to cover the costs of 
providing that added quality. 
Wheat  Cleanliness  and the  ERS  Wheat  Quality study 
International  and  domestic policy developments  have  made  the 
identification of quality premiums difficult.  A quality 
attribute that has  received  a  tremendous  amount  of attention, 
primarily because it can be effectively addressed through  a 
change  in wheat grades  and  standards,  is the cleanliness of 
wheat.  Both  Canada  and Australia clean their grain to levels far 
cleaner than necessary to meet  most contract requirements. 
Because their export. grain is marketed through monopsonistic 
marketing boards,  maintaining the highest quality characteristics 
(especially related to cleanliness or low  levels of dockage  and 
foreign material)  has been relatively easy to accomplish.  For 
the United states,  dockage is measured  and  reported by  FGIS  for 
all shipments  and  limits may  be specified in a  purchase contract 
if the buyer chooses,  but it is not  a  grade-determining factor. 
Dockage  levels in commercial  sales of U.s.  wheat are, 
consequently,  0.6 to 0.8  percent compared to 0.2  to 0.3  percent 
for Canadian  and Australian wheat.  Inclusion of dockage  limits 
as  a  wheat grade-determining characteristic would effectively 
require more  cleaning of U.s.  wheat  for export.  The  economic 
issue is whether the benefits of this change would  cover the 
additional costs. 
The U.s.  Congress,  through the Food,  Agriculture,  Conservation, 
and Trade Act of  1990  (FACT),  section xx,  decided to focus  on  a 
narrow but tractable part of the grain quality debate.  It 
required  a  comprehensive  commodity-by-commodity study of the 
economic costs and benefits of cleaning grain destined for 
export.  Commodities to be studied include wheat,  corn,  soybeans, 
sorghum,  and barley.  The  FACT  requires that the  FGIS  establish or 
amend  grain grades and  standards to include  "economically and 
commercially practical levels of cleanliness"  for grain meeting 
the requirements of U.S.  No.  3  or better.  In order to satisfy the 
requirement that a  study be done,  the FGIS  entered into a 
research agreement with the ERS  to analyze the technical 
constraints and net economic benefits associated with enacting 
the changes.  The  first commodity  studied was  wheat. 
There were  two parts,  a  domestic  component  and  an international 
component,  to the ERS  study.  The  domestic  component  measured the 
cost of cleaning U.s.  export wheat to a  0.35-0.4 percent ending 
dockage  level,  and where  in the marketing chain it was  most 
efficient to perform the cleaning.  The  goal  of the international 
component  of the study was  to assess premiums  that foreign buyers 
were willing to pay  for cleaner wheat and/or any  increase in u.s. 
4 wheat exports. 
The  Trade Modeling  Perspective 
This paper is not  a  part of the formal  ERS  study prepared  for 
FGIS  because it is based on  a  modeling  framework  which could not 
be constructed in time to be fully  incorporated into the report 
for  Congress.  This paper does build on work already completed at 
ERS  and  supporting institutions. It analyzes the benefits and 
costs of cleaning u.s.  export wheat  from the  framework  of a  model 
of world wheat trade.  The  structure of the model  and  many  of the 
parameter values used therein are based  on the  in-depth analyses 
of foreign wheat markets  conducted as part of the wheat  component 
of the Grain Quality study. 
The trade model  perspective affords various advantages  in 
defining the explicit goals for the study.  These benefits 
include: 
o  Support  for results  from  an economically consistent and 
empirically based modeling  system; 
o  Ability to distinguish between short  (wheat production 
fixed)  and  medium  term  (production adjusts to price changes) 
effects; 
o  Ability to analyze the targeting of the export of cleaner 
wheat to those markets that demand  cleaner wheat  and are 
willing to pay  for it; and 
o  Ability to analyze the effect of cleaner u.s.  export wheat 
on export competitors  (that is,  Canada),  and to draw  out 
implications of  a  competitive Canadian  response. 
The  next section discusses  in more detail insights  from the ERS 
study.  The  ERS  study provides three critical elements to this 
paper.  First,  the surveys provide extensive descriptive 
information useful  in specifying wheat  import demand  in the 
model.  Second,  the domestic  component of the ERS  study provides 
an estimate of the increase in costs due to wheat cleaning prior 
to export shipment.  In modeling terms,  this information is 
incorporated as  an upward shift in the U.S.  excess supply 
schedule  for wheat.  Third,  it provides estimates of changed wheat 
purchasing behavior if it were the case that cleaner u.S.  wheat 
(comparable to Canadian and Australian levels)  were provided to a 
particular importer  included in the survey.  This  information is 
interpreted either as  a  price premium willing to be paid for 
cleaner u.S.  wheat or as  an  increase in purchases of u.S.  wheat 
at constant prices. 
5 THE  ERS  STUDY 
Although broad wheat quality issues have been of interest,  the 
ERS  study has  focused  primarily on wheat cleanliness.  Wheat 
cleanliness refers to levels of dockage  and  foreign material 
(PM).  Dockage  is non-millable material that can be  removed 
through cleaning because the weight and/or size of the material 
(such as weed  seeds,  chaff,  stems,  and  stones)  is different  from 
wheat.  PM,  on the other hand,  is non-millable material that is 
more  costly to remove  because of similarities of weight,  size, 
and  shape to wheat. 
Domestic  Component  of the ERS  Study 
Winter wheat cleaning was  analyzed by  Adam  and Anderson  of 
Oklahoma  State University  (1991).  Spring wheat  cleaning was 
analyzed  in four  reports by  researchers at North  Dakota State 
University:  Scherping,  Cobia,  Johnson,  and Wilson  (1992); 
Johnson,  Scherping,  and Wilson  (1992);  Johnson  and Wilson  (1992); 
and Wilson,  Scherping,  and Johnson  (1992). 
There are both costs and domestic benefits to cleaning wheat 
prior to export.  The  largest cost factor  in removing  non-millable 
material is wheat  loss,  accounting  for up to 85  percent of total 
cleaning costs.  Domestic benefits result  from  the sales of 
screenings  from the cleaning process and  from  savings  in 
transportation and storage costs.  For winter wheat,  sub-terminal 
elevators were  found  to be the least-cost location for additional 
cleaning,  costing about  3.8  cents/bushel  (bu).  After considering 
the domestic benefits,  the net cost of cleaning winter wheat  was 
calculated at 1.6 cent/bu.  For spring and  durum wheat,  country 
elevators were  found  to be the least-cost location:  1.9 cents/bu. 
Taking  into account benefits  from  cleaning  (0.3  cents/bu),  the 
net cost of cleaning was  calculated at 1.6 cents/bu,  the  same  as 
for winter wheat.  It was  determined that white wheat  can be 
efficiently cleaned at the country elevator level  (4.3  cents/bu 
less the benefit 0.8  cents/bu for  a  net cost of  3.5 cents/bu)  or 
the export elevator  (3.7  cents/bu but with benefits of only 0.2 
cents/bu,  for the  same  net cost of 3.5 cents/bu). 
International  Component 
ERS  selected 18  countries that import wheat  as case studies. 
Countries  included in the study were  selected on the basis of 
their share of purchases  on the world wheat market.2  In  1992 
2The  three  major  exceptions  to  this  criterion were  Algeria, 
which  was  excluded because of political unrest in early 1992,  and 
Togo  and  Ghana,  which were  added to provide  some  coverage of Sub-
6 these  18  countries accounted  for  58  percent of world wheat 
imports  and  63  percent of u.s.  sales.  Table  1  lists these 
countries.  Table  1  also summarizes  the  factors  in those countries 
that affect wheat market structure,  and  summarizes  implications 
for u.s.  wheat exports. 
Based  on  survey results,  Pick et ale  (1993)  analyzed the relative 
importance that importers  and  foreign millers attach to wheat 
quality characteristics and  how  exporters were  perceived to 
perform relative to those characteristics.  They  found  that u.s. 
wheat  fared worse than Canadian wheat  in all quality 
characteristics included in the survey.  The  presence of non-
millable material was  the characteristic that most differentiated 
u.s.  wheat  from  Canadian wheat.  The  other most  important  -
characteristics where u.s.  wheat  fell short were price,  and 
gluten and protein quality. 
The  surveys are  a  source of estimates of how  much  demand  for U.S. 
wheat would  change if the wheat were  cleaned prior to export. 
Table  2  summarizes  survey results regarding the expected demand 
expansion,  either in terms  of  a  percentage  increase in  imports or 
in terms  of  a  willingness to pay price premium.  Countries that 
might  expand their imports of U.S.  wheat are Italy,  Brazil, 
Venezuela,  China,  Japan,  the Philippines,  Ghana,  and  Togo.  The 
last two  columns  show the expected volume  expansions,  based  on 
either a  1989/90 July-June crop year  (the model's base as 
explained below)  or on  a  1991/92  July-June crop year  (which 
corresponds to when  the surveys were  done).  In both cases,  the 
aggregate  increase in demand  for u.s.  wheat  is about  1.5 percent, 
relative to total u.s.  wheat exports.  The  objective of the 
modeling effort,  described below,  is to estimate the net gains 
(expanded export revenue  less net cleaning costs)  emanating  from 
the expanded  demand  summarized  in this table. 
A  THREE-STAGE  THEORY  OF  WHEAT  IMPORT  DEMAND 
The  country surveys  indicate that wheat is far  from  being an 
homogenous  commodity  (as is well  known  to most agricultural 
economists).  To  capture the contribution of the surveys,  one 
needs  a  structure that can translate that information  into a 
workable modeling context.  This  section,  therefore,  describes  a 
theoretical model  of wheat  import  demand  that jointly underlies 
the organization of the surveys  and the model  used  in this paper. 
The  following  section continues the process by describing the 
translation of the theoretical model  into an operational  one. 
The  demand  for wheat differs  from  country to country,  depending 
primarily on the end uses  intended for the wheat.  The  surveys 
Saharan Africa. 
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No  domestic  production  0 
Distribution pattern:  70X  - high 
protein;  20X  - durum;  lOX  - soft  0 
Import market  share sensitive to  0 
Canadian marketing strategies  0 
High  storage costs,  poor facilities 
30X  of market  demands  high protein  0 
wheat 
Declining domestic  production due  to  0 
cuts  in subsidy  payments 
5  year Long  Term  Agreement with 
Argentina  (1988-93)  for  2  MHT 
Tariff preference for Argentine wheat 
Criteria ranking  for high protein  0 
sourcing:  price,  quality 
Imports high protein wheat with good  a 
gluten characteristics for blending  0 
with domestic  and  EC  wheat 
Imports  durum  wheat with preference for  0 
Canadian durum because of color;  U.S. 
durum  used  in dessert pasta 
Imported wheat  is priced close to  EC  0 
threshold price 
Millers  pay fraction of import cost and  0 
do not influence buying decisions or 
source determination 
Foreign exchange is major  constraint  0 
Government buying  authority generally  0 
imports  only  common  wheat. 
Domestic  production relies on rainfall, 
therefore,  it is highly variable 
EC  has had  a  tradition presence,  but 
moisture  levels are high;  Very little 
Canadian wheat has  been  imported in 
past. 
Strong price competition between the  0 
U.S.  and  EC 
Government  sets wheat prices  and 
controls  imports.  Imports vary with 
domestic  production. 
Durum  wheat is usually 60  percent of  0 
production.  There is a  preference for 
EC  durum. 
"Panseasonal"  and  "panterritorial"  0 
prices discourages  storage investments. 
Preferred blending ratio of domestic 
U.S.-EC wheat  is:  20-40-40 
Nonetheless,  price  competition among  0 
exporters  is strong for  given year. 
8 
Most u.s.  exports  are high 
protein wheat 
Primary competitor is Canada 
Strong price competition 
There exists  a  minimum  level of 
U.S.  shipments  to cover winter 
months. 
U.S.  competes with Canada for high 
protein market. 
Argentine wheat  substitutes  for 
declining domestic  wheat;  little 
opportunity for  increased U.S. 
exports in lower protein market. 
GSH  program is important. 
Main  U.S.  competitor is Canada 
Intrinsic characteristics are 
paramount 
U.S.  and Canadian  durum not 
readily substitutable 
High price stresses  importance  of 
quality characteristics 
Availability of credit  (GSM)  and 
price competitiveness  (EEP)  are of 
primary importance 
Argentina is relatively 
unimportant  competitor because 
cannot offer credit terms. 
U.S.  durum  exports  are not 
typically high. 
EEP  is important. 
U.S.  durum market  share is  low. 
Encourages  the importation of 
wheat. 
EEP  and  PL-480  are important for 
U.S.  market  share. Continuation of Table  1 
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Consumers  demand  only high-raised  0 
loaves.  Implies that only high-protein 
wheat is imported.  0 
Supplier choice determined by  aid and 
prices.  0 
With liberalization of import  regime, 
servicing will be more  important 
determinant of supplier choice. 
Consumers  favor  French-style bread and  0 
pastries.  High-raised loaf  (popular  in 
Ghana)  is smaller share of market.  0 
At  least 20  percent of imports  are 
transshipped to other African countries. 
Supplier chOice  determined by  (1)  trade  0 
servicing/personal relationships,  (2) 
price,  and  (3)  quality 
White  wheat is staple crop  0 
Government has  monopoly  in domestic 
procurement  and  importation.  Goal is 
food  security.  Wheat  consumption is 
subsidized. 
Preference for Australian ASW:  0 
government willing to pay  a  price 
premium. 
Remaining  imports  are soft wheat.  0 
Competition is primarily on  the 
basis of price  and  credit availability. 
Ministry of Supply  and  Trade  (MST) 
responsible for  importing wheat  and 
flour.  Imports  are determined by price 
and  credit.  Domestic  wheat is preferred. 
Local tastes  for bread determine wheat  0 
demand:  tanour  (flat):  40-45 percent; 
ragif  (pita):  15-20  percent;  roti 
(French):  40  percent.  Soft wheat  is 
preferred. 
Wheat  is staple crop.  Domestic  wheat  is  0 
preferred for Atta flour:  semi-hard, 
white,  low moisture,  protein in 12-13  0 
percent range. 
Imports vary with size of domestic  crop.  0 
Credit  and price are determining factors 
for  supplier choice. 
Proportion of demand  for  imported wheat  0 
is  50-50 hard and soft varieties.  0 
Chief variables affecting imports  are 
price  and credit. 
9 
u.S.  exports restricted to HRS  and 
HRW. 
Canada is competitor.  No 
significant EC  presence. 
PL-480  and  EEP  are  important U.S. 
policy tools. 
u.S.  hard wheat  less demanded.  EC 
has market  share. 
However,  demand  for  U.S.  wheat not 
solely determined by  Togo  consumer 
preferences. 
EEP  is important,  but may  be more 
useful in competing  against Canada 
rather than EC. 
Strong preference for white wheat, 
domestically grown. 
u.S.  wheat not strongly 
competitive with ASW 
u.S.  competes  with the  EC.  EEP, 
GSM,  and  PL-480  are  important. 
Main  U.S.  competitors  in soft 
wheat market are Australia and  the 
EC. 
Variable demand  for U.S.  Western 
White  (WW). 
Low  gluten of WW  implies blending 
with domestic  wheat. 
GSM  and  PL-480  preserve U.S. 
market presence. 
u.S.  can reliably supply types. 
U.S.  is dominant  supplier because 
of EEP  and  PL-480. Continuation of Table  1 
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Japanese  Food  Agency  makes  sourcing  0 
choices.  Primary concern is  food 
security.  Diversification among 
sources  favored. 
Domestic  wheat  is soft wheat  with  poor  0 
gluten characteristics.  Blended with 
ASW  to produce noodles.  0 
Consumers  prefer WW  for  confectionery 
flour. 
Milling wheat has  many  end-uses.  0 
Millers  are quality conscious. 
Complaints  about U.S.  wheat relate to 
variable protein levels. 
Australian wheat is perceived  as 
having  favorable  characteristics. 
Feed  wheat is very volatile -- depends  0 
on  relationship to price of corn. 
Uniform pricing system to millers  0 
regardless of landed price centers 
attention on quality characteristics. 
Long-standing  trade relationships  are 
important. 










Urban  and  rural wheat markets  are 
distinct.  Urban  wheat  consumption 
utilizes 20  percent of domestic 
production.  Imports  supplement 
domestic wheat  in urban market. 
There  is  a  preference for high protein 
wheat  from Australia  and Canada  to 
blend with U.S.  and  domestic wheat. 
Government  purchasing  agency  (CEROILS) 
is price sensitive but considers 
quality characteristics. 
Canadian wheat has  a  transport rate 
advantage  over  the U.S.  Chinese do not 
permit  imports of U.S.  WW  from Western 
ports. 
No  domestic  production 
Wheat  imports  compete with rice. 
o 
o 
Private sector imports wheat  - only one  0 
mill imports Canadian wheat. 
Millers base  import decisions  primarily 
on price.  Quality factors  include 
protein and mOisture. 
There  is a  preference for hard wheat  - 0 
70  percent of consumption. 
10 
Market  share balance  implies 
policy-induced  low 
substitutability of U.S.  wheat 
with that of Canada  and Australia. 
U.S.  wheat  does  not  compete  with 
domestic  wheat. 
No  demand  for soft wheat  from  the 
EC. 
Although  U.S.  has  had  dominant 
market  share,  competition  from 
Australia and  Canada  appears  to be 
growing. 
Market  shares  can vary year-to 
year. 
Imports of U.S.  wheat  favored. 
U.S.  exports mostly  SRW  that 
competes  directly with EC  and 
domestic  wheat. 
EEP  is necessary to remain 
competitive. 
u.S.  has traditional market 
presence but price-consciousness 
requires  EEP  for U.S.  to remain 
competitive. 
Primary U.S.  competitor is Canada. Continuation of Table  1 
Market  Structure and  Competitiveness  in Foreign Wheat  Markets 
Countries 
Indonesia 
Factors Affecting Market  Structure 
and Competitiveness 






Wheat  imports  regulated through BULOG.  0 
Adjustable quota used to control prices. 
Flour prices  are highly regulated  and  do 
not reflect differing costs of imported 
wheat. 
Food use of wheat  impl~ following flour  0 
consumption:  high protein,  30-35 percent 
(HRW);  medium  protein,  60-65 percent 
(preferred blend:  40  percent,  ASW;  40 
percent,  CWRS;  20  percent,  Saudi);  low 
protein,  5  percent  for biscuits  (ASW). 
Australian wheat has  transport 
advantage.  U.S.  harmed by  increased 
competition  from Canada  and  new 
entrants:  Argentina,  Saudi Arabia,  and 
Turkey. 
Government  control implies 
price sensitivity. 
Small U.S.  market  share threatened 
by  lower-priced competition. 
Table  2  -- Additional  Benefits  from  Cleaning Wheat 
Country  Increase  in  Price  Premium  Volume  Trade  Volume  Trade 
Imports  from  Willing to  Expansion:  Expansion: 
U.S.  Pay  1989/90  Base  1991/92  Base 
(percent)  (Dollar/mt)  (1000  mt)  (1000  mt) 
Italy  37-49%  4-8  216  176 
Brazil  15%  - 20  99 
Venezuela  20-30%  4  180  93 
China  1%  - 56  62 
Japan  - 2  17  22 
Philippines  - 1  5  8 
Ghana  30-35%  5  15  26 
Togo  10%  5  5  7 
Total  - - 514  493 
"-"-not applicable 
Source:  Estimated by  survey respondents. 
11 that were  described above,  and  in table 1,  provide an 
understanding of demand  relationships  in each of the countries. 
It is necessary,  however,  to provide  a  theoretical structure in 
which descriptive data can be conceptually organized  for purposes 
of specifying the model  used  in the analysis. 
Here it is convenient to utilize a  modeling structure described 
by Hjort  (1988)  where  the demand  for wheat is separated into 
three stages.  In the first stage,  the  importer determines  how 
much  wheat  needs  to be  imported to satisfy domestic  end-use 
demand  for wheat.  In the second stage,  the  importer determines 
what class(es)  of wheat will most  "efficiently" satisfy wheat 
import  demand  determined  in the first stage.  In the third stage, 
the  importer determines  from  which  supplier to purchase the class 
of wheat determined  in the second stage.  Figure  1  is a  schema  of 
this structure.  A  fuller description of the theoretical model 
constitutes the  remainder of this section. 
stage  1 
In the first stage,  importers determine total wheat  needs.  There 
are several steps associated with this stage.  First,  there is a 
determination of the availability of domestic wheats.  Then,  there 
is a  determination of demand  for wheats  of various 
characteristics by millers and perhaps  feed manufacturers.  This 
information determines  excess  demand  for different wheat 
characteristics. 
The  next step of the first stage is to determine the availability 
of concessional terms  for wheat  importers.  The  importer's goal  is 
the maximization of  import quantities of wheat that are donated 
or obtained noncommercially  such that demand  for wheat 
characteristics and expenditure allocation  from  exporters are 
satisfied.  The  residual  demand  (or demand  for  "stage 1"  wheat)  is 
that which is to be purchased in the commercial market at market 
prices to satisfy remaining demand  after donations  for wheat 
characteristics. 
For the next  two  stages,  it is assumed that there exists some 
level of substitution among  wheat classes and suppliers so that 
it is possible to aggregate across characteristics to obtain  a 
quality standard  (referred to as  "standard quality wheat"  below) 
that can be satisfied by the importation of wheats  of different 
classes  from different suppliers.  In other words,  the  importing 
agent can determine the classes of wheat that will satisfy excess 
demands,  given rates of sUbstitution between the "standard 
quality wheat"  and wheat classes  from  export suppliers. 
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13 stage  2 
In the second stage,  the  importer determines level of wheat class 
imports that will satisfy "stage 1"  demand.  Weak  separability is 
assumed:  that is,  the marginal  rates of substitution among  wheat 
classes are  independent of the determination of "stage 1"  demand. 
The  goal  of the  importer is to minimize the cost of fulfilling 
the aggregate demand  for wheat.  This goal holds  for both private 
and state traders.  The  solution to the optimization problem  shows 
the mix of wheats that will satisfy demand  for wheat quality 
-characteristics. 
stage  3 
In the third stage,  the  importer determines the exporters to 
fulfill class level wheat  demand.  Weak  separability is again 
assumed:  the marginal  rates of substitution between suppliers of 
wheat are  independent of quantities of other classes of  imported 
wheat.  Factors that influence supplier-specific quality 
characteristics are potentially many  but in particular include 
spatial/timing characteristics; political and trade ties; policy 
goals,  including supply assurance and diversification objectives. 
The  formal  goal  is the maximization of class  i  importing agent's 
utility given the choice of multi-sourced class  i  wheat  and given 
the expenditure constraint from  stage 2.  The  solution is the 
compensated  demand  that depends  on the quantity of class  i 
imports plus the price of all within-class wheats. 
MODELING  FRAMEWORK 
The  modeling  framework  is a  modified  (explained in next 
paragraph)  version of SWOPSIM.  (Roningen,  Sullivan,  and  Dixit, 
1991).  SWOPSIM  is a  static,  partial equilibrium,  nonspatial 
modeling  framework.  Supply and  demand  are  functions  of own  and 
cross prices.  Trade is the difference between domestic  supply and 
demand.  Domestic  incentive prices depend  on the level of consumer 
and producer support and  on world prices denominated  in local 
currency.  Price transmission elasticities regulate the extent to 
which domestic prices change  when  world prices change.  World 
markets clear when  net trade of  a  commodity  across all regions 
sums  to zero.  3 
3In  order  to  avoid  confusion,  the  reader  is  reminded  that 
SWOPSIM  is  a  modeling  framework  and  not  a  formal  model  of 
agricultural trade used for trade liberalization analysis.  Because 
SWOPSIM  was  originally developed  at  ERS  for  trade  liberalization 
14 In order to make  the modeling  framework  consistent with the 
theory of differentiated wheat  demand,  the  framework  must  be 
modified because the  SWOPSIM  structure assumes  product 
homogeneity.  The  framework  is modified by  a  procedure 
attributable to Armington  (1969).  The  Armington procedure 
provides  a  straight-forward method of calculating own  and  cross 
price elasticities between classes of wheat  sourced  from 
differing wheat  exporters and domestic  sources  (as  illustrated in 
figure  1).4 
The  Armington  framework  assumes that the wheat  import agent's 
utility function takes  on  a  specific  ~onstant elasticity of 
substitution  (CES)  form: 
-...l. 
U i  =  [1: p~* (M/) -qi]  qj 
j 
(1) 
where  i  indexes wheat classes,  j  indexes wheat  source countries, 
M represents wheat  import levels,  q  is a  sUbstitution parameter 
and P is a  constant incorporating non-price demand  factors. 
Solution of the maximization problem  (using  Mi  as  a  proxy  for 
unobservable  U
i  and letting p  represent price)  is: 
analysis,  many  confuse  the  trade  liberalization  model  (that  is, 
STa6)  with the framework.  As referenced below,  however,  some of the 
same  parameters  used  in  the  trade  liberalization model  are  also 
used  in the model  constructed for the analysis in this report. 
4Armington  restrictions  have  been  tested  in  international 
wheat  and  cotton  markets  by  Alston  and  others  (1990).  In 
particular,  the  validity  of  stringent  Armington  homotheticity 
(embedded  in the  CES  utility  index)  and  s~parability assumptions 
(see  theory  section)  are  put  into  ser10US  question.  From  a 
practical point of view,  it does not seem likely that wheat import 
market  shares  change  only  in  response  to  relative  wheat  price 
changes  (excepting exogenous demand shifts associated with cleaner 
wheat)  as  implied  by  the  CES  specification.  The  most  serious 
implication noted by Alston et ale  is that estimates of own  price 
import elasticities will  be biased  upward  (that is,  they will  be 
less  negative  than  they  should  be.)  This  is  due  to  missing 
explanatory  variables  (substitute  goods  in  particular)  whose 
effects are picked up  in the  own  price term.  Although this effect 
is  serious  for  those  performing  estimation,  it is  not  directly 
applicable  to  this  work  because  the  Armington  structure  is 
superimposed  on  already-estimated  demand  elasticities  from  the 
SWOPSIM  trade liberalization data base. 
15 (2) 
where 
1  (3) 
Equation  2  cannot be directly incorporated into SWOPSIM.  Based  on 
the three stages of the theoretical model,  own  and cross price 
elasticities can be derived,  however.  The  necessary elements are 
an  own  price elasticity of demand  for standard quality wheat 
(stage 1),  elasticities of sUbstitution corresponding to wheat 
classes  (a,  stage  2)  and to wheat suppliers of particular classes 
(ai'  stage 3),  and  consumption and/or  import shares. 
The elasticities are derived in stages.  The  first stage 
corresponds to the own-price  demand elasticity for standard 
quality wheat.  The  second stage refers to the demand  for classes 
of wheat.  Calculation of  own  and cross price elasticities are 
based  on the Armington specification.  Define the  following: 
~  = demand elasticity for standard quality wheat 
~ii  =  own  price demand elasticity of class  i  wheat 
~ih  = cross price demand elasticity of class  i  wheat 
with respect to class h  wheat 
Sh  = expenditure share of class h  wheat  imports 
The  own  price demand elasticity for class  i  wheat  can be  shown to 
equal: 
The  cross price demand elasticity of class  i  wheat with respect 
to class h  wheat  can be  shown to equal: 
For the third stage,  define additional  own  and cross price 
elasticities as  follows: 
~i.jj  =  own  price demand elasticity of class  i  wheat 
from  exporter  j 
~i.jm  = cross price demand elasticity of class  i  wheat 
from  exporter  j  with respect to exporter m 
16 Si,m  = expenditure share of class  i  wheat  imports  from 
supplier m 
Values  for these elasticities can be calculated based  on 
equations  resembling equations  4  and  5,  and given within-class 
elasticities of substitution between wheat suppliers and 
appropriate expenditure share data: 
" ... = - (1-5 ..  ) *0·  +  5·  .*" '1  ~,JJ  ~,J  ~  ~,J  ~  (6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Data  Requirements 
The data source for supply,  trade flows,  and  export prices was 
the International Wheat  Council  (IWC,  1992).  The  IWC  also 
published transport rates for selected trade routes  and  some 
subsidy data for the united states and the European  Community 
(EC).  The  transport data,  however,  were  far  from  complete; 
therefore,  they were  supplemented with data  from Maritime 
Research,  Inc.  Also,  the USDA  was  a  more  complete source of data 
for U.s.  wheat class trade flows,  export enhancement  program 
(EEP)  subsidies,  and  PL-480  wheat sales and donations. 
Elasticity values used  in this research come  from  (or are based 
on)  two differing sources.  The first source is the ERS  SWOPSIM 
model:  supply  and  demand elasticities  (Sullivan,  Roningen, 
Leetmaa,  and  Gray,  1992)  and price transmission elasticities 
(Sullivan,  1990). 
The values of the remaining elasticities were  inferred by the 
authors of this report based on  a  review of the surveys.  These 
are the elasticities that measure the degree to which wheat 
classes from differing suppliers SUbstitute for  a  country's 
standard quality wheat.  Equations  4-8  were used to calculate own 
and cross price elasticities that are inputted into the model. 
Table  3  shows  the countries/region in the model,  the  SWOPSIM 
country codes associated with each country/region,  the net trade 
position of each country/region  (wheat net exporter or importer), 
whether the country was  part of the ERS  survey  (importers only), 
and  sources  for survey results.  There are six wheat exporters and 
the wheat  from  each is assumed to be different from that of the 
other exporters.  (The  exporter country codes are used to refer to 
17 Table  3  -- countries  and  Regions  in world  Wheat  Model 
Country/Region  Code  Exporter  (EX)  or  IN  or OUT  of  Researchers 
Importer  (IH)  Survey 
United States  US  EX  OUT 
Canada  CN  EX  OUT 
European Community  EC  EX  OUT 
Australia  AU  EX  OUT 
Argentina  AR  EX  OUT 
Saudi Arabia  SA  EX  OUT 
Venezuela  VE  IM  IN  Setia  &.  Dusch 
Brazil  BZ  IM  IN  Mc  Clain  &.  Dusch 
Mexico,  Cent.  Am.,  &.  Carib.  CA  IM  OUT 
Other Latin America  LA  IM  OUT 
Italy  IT  IM  IN  Plunkett 
Other Western Europe  WE  IM  OUT 
Former  Soviet Union  SV  IM  IN  Sheffield 
Eastern Europe  EE  IM  OUT 
Morocco  HR  IM  IN  Ackerman 
Tunisia  TN  IM  IN  Lent 
Other  North Africa  NA  IM  OUT 
Ghana  GH  IM  IN  Missiaen  &.  Smith 
Togo  TG  IM  IN  Missiaen  &.  Smith 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  AF  IM  OUT 
Egypt  EG  IM  IN  Parker  &.  Shapouri 
Yemen  YH  IM  IN  Johnson  &.  Parker 
Pakistan  PIC  IM  IN  Landes  &.  Ash 
Sri Lanka  SL  IM  IN  Landes  &.  Ash 
Other  Near  East  HE  IM  OUT 
Japan  JP  IM  IN  Caplan  &.  Webb 
South Korea  SK  IM  IN  Raney  &.  Morgan 
Taiwan  TW  IM  IN  Huang  &.  Lin 
China  CH  IM  IN  Colby,  Crook,  &.  Lin 
Philippines  PH  IM  IN  Levin  &.  Lin 
Indonesia  DO  IM  IN  Magiera 
Other Far East  FE  IM  OUT 
Rest-of-World  RW  IM  OUT 
the wheat  from  each of the exporters.)  Wheat  produced  in other 
countries  (including the importing countries)  is labeled merely 
as  "wheat". 
Tables  4-8  show the model's organization of wheat  consumption  in 
each of the importing countries/regions.  The  wheat class 
categories were mainly  inferred from  the surveys.  For the 
countries and  regions not surveyed,  historical wheat  import and 
consumption patterns were relied upon to construct the wheat 
class categories.  The  consumption data  in the tables are  from  the 
IWC  and  USDA. 
Parameter values used in the model  are documented  in an  appendix 
to this paper.  Class and supplier SUbstitution elasticities are 
largely a  function of a  country's wheat  end use characteristics; 
that is,  they depend  on  consumption preferences for products that 
use wheat  as  an  input.  The elasticities also are reflective of 
the preferences of,  and the constraints faced by,  those who  make 
18 Table" -- Wheat  Classes  and  SUDDliersfQr_l~8iJ90: Latin America 
Country/Region  Wheat  Class  Principal Suppliers  Imports  from 
- Wheat  Consumption  United States 
Venezuela  Hard  (.93)  US  (.82);  CN  (.18);  HRS  (.73);  HRW  (.04); 
DURUM  (.23); 
0.86  mmt  Soft  (.07)  US  (1. 00) ;  SRW  (1.00); 
Brazil  Preferred  (.95)  DM  (.83);  AR  (.17);  -
7.06  mmt  Hard  (.05)  CN  (.62);  US  (.38);  HRW  (1. 00); 
Mexico,  Central America,  Hard  (.26)  US  (.67);  CN  (.33);  HRS  (.70);  HRW  (.26); 
and the Caribbean  DURUM  (. 04) ; 
7.03  mmt  Soft  (.74)  DM  (.78);  EC  (.13);  SRW  (.91);  WW  (.09); 
US  (.07);  AR  (.02); 
Other Latin America  High  Protein  (.29)  US  (.86);  CN  (.14);  HRS  (.36);  HRW  (.64); 
5.08  mmt  Lower  Protein  (.71)  DM  (.79);  AR  (.17);  SRW  (.82);  WW  (.18); 
US  (.02);  EC  (.02); 
Notes:  See  Table  1  for  supplier codes,  except  DM  =  domestic. 
U.S.  wheat classes:  HRS  =  Hard  Red  Spring;  HRW  - Hard  Red  Winter;  SRW  - Soft Red  Winter; 
WW  - Western White. 
"_"  - not applicable 
The  proportions  in parentheses  following  a  wheat classification code  represent  the  share 
of the ·classification category of the higher-order category. 
19 Table  5  -- Wheat  Classes  and  SUDDliers  for  1989190:  EuroDe 
Co~ntry/Region  Wheat  Class  Principal Suppliers  Imports  from 
- Wheat  Consumption  United States 
Italy  EC  (.91)  DM  (.83);  -
Other  EC  (.17); 
9.81  mmt  Hard  (.06)  US  (.62);  CN  (.35);  HRS  (1. 00); 
SA  (.03); 
Durum  (.03)  CN  (.51);  US  (.49);  DURUM  (1. 00) ; 
European Community  Domestic  (.98)  DM  (1. 00)  -
(excluding Italy) 
53.84 mmt  Foreign  (.02)  CN  (.46);  US  (.35);  HRS  (.57);  HRW  (.06); 
SA  (.19);  SRW  (.12);  DURUM  (.25); 
Other Western  Europe  Hard  (.05)  SA  (.41);  CN  (.39);  HRS  (1. 00) ; 
US  (.20); 
10.89  mmt  Soft  (.95)  DM  (.97);  EC  (.03);  -
Former  Soviet Union  Wheat  (1. 00)  DM  (.879);  US  (.042);  HRS  (.33);  HRW  (.49); 
107.10 mmt  EC  (.041);  CN  (.033);  SRW  (.18); 
AR  (.005); 
Eastern Europe  Hard  (.003)  CN  (.74);  AU  (.15);  DURUM  (1. 00) ; 
US  (.11); 
39.66  mmt  Soft  (.997)  DM  (.98);  EC  (.02);  -
Note:  See  notes  in Table  4. 
20 Table  6  -- Wheat  Classes  and  SUDDliers~or 1989/90:  North  and  Sub-Saharan Africa 
~--.  -------
country/Region  Wheat  Class  Principal Suppliers  Imports  from 
- Wheat  Consumption  United States 
Morocco  Durum  (.45)  DM  (1. 00);  -
3.93  mmt  Common  (.55)  DM  (.68);  US  (.16);  HRS  (.30);  HRW  (.24); 
EC  (.16);  SRW  (.46); 
Tunisia  Durum  (.45)  DM  (.53);  EC  (.43);  DURUM  (1. 00); 
US  (.04); 
1.42  mmt  Common  (.55)  EC  (.43);  US  (.38);  HRS  (.14);  HRW  (.22); 
DM  (.19);  SRW  (.64); 
Other North Africa  Durum  (.53)  DM  (.38);  CN  (.28);  DURUM  (1. 00) ; 
US  (.20);  EC  (.14); 
4.19  mmt  Common  (.47)  EC  (.48);  US  (.30);  HRS  (.27);  HRW  (.29); 
DM  (.20);  CN  (.02);  SRW  (.44); 
Ghana  Hard  (1. 00)  CN  (.63);  US  (.37);  HRS  (.93);  HRW  (.07); 
0.12  mmt 
Togo  Hard  (.85)  US  (.70);  CN  (.30);  HRS  (93); 
HRW  & SRW  (.07); 
0.08  mmt  Soft  (.15)  EC  (1. 00);  -
Other  Sub-Saharan Africa  Domestic  (.53)  DM  (1. 00) ;  -
7.40  mmt  Hard  (.17)  US  (.52);  CN  (.30);  HRS  (.04);  HRW  (.96); 
SA  (.18); 
Soft  (.30)  EC  (.96);  US  (.04);  SRW  (l.  00); 
Note:  See  notes  in Table  4. 
21 Table  7  -- Wheat  Classes  and  SUDDliers  for  1989190:  Egy»t  and  Western Asia 
- ---- -------
Country/Region  Wheat  Class  Principal Suppliers  Imports  from 
- Wheat  Consumption  United States 
Egypt  (imports)  Australian  (.26)  AU  (1.00);  -
6.94 mmt  (.68  of total  Other  (.74)  US  (.65);  EC  (.35);  HRS  (.02);  HRW  (.02); 
Egyptian, consumption)  SRW  (.66);  WW  (.30); 
Yemen  Wheat  (1. 00)  AU  (.41);  EC  (.37);  SRW  (.51);  WW  (.49); 
US  (.14);  CN  (.02); 
1.09  mmt  DM  (.06); 
Pakistan  Domestic  (.88)  DM  (1. 00);  -
16.31  mmt  Foreign  (.12)  US  (.67);  AU  (.24);  WW  (1. 00); 
EC  (.05);  CN  (.04); 
Sri Lanka  Hard  (.50)  US  (.89);  SA  (.10);  HRS  (.44);  HRW  (.56); 
CN  (.01); 
0.77  mmt  Soft  (.50)  US  (.76);  EC  (.14);  SRW  (.66);  WW  (.34); 
AU  (.10); 
Other Near  East  Australia  (.25)  AU  (1.00);  -
(imports) 
14.62  mmt  Other  (.75)  EC  (.33);  US  (.26);  HRS  (.03);  HRW  (.72); 
CN  (.21);  AR  (.20);  DURUM  (.04);  SRW  (.17); 
WW  (.04); 
Note:  See  notes  in Table  4. 
22 Table  8  -- Wheat  Classes  and  Suppliers  tor 1'89/90:  Far  East 
- -
Country/Region  Wheat  Class  Principal Suppliers  Imports  from 
- Wheat  Consumption  United States 
Japan  High Quality  (.79)  US  (.56);  CN  (.29);  HRS  (.32);  HRW  (.40); 
AU  (.15);  WW  (.28); 
6.34 mmt  Lower  Quality  (.21)  DM  (.75);  AU  (.25);  -
Korea  High  Protein  (.42)  US  (.97);  CN  (.03);  HRS  (.40);  HRW  (.60); 
l.  79  mmt  Lower  Protein  (.59)  US  (.78);  AU  (.22);  WW  (l.  00); 
Taiwan  Hard  (.84)  US  (.84);  CN  (.16);  HRS  (.49);  HRW  (.51); 
0.82 mmt  Soft  (.16)  US  (l.00);  WW  (l.  00); 
China  (urban sector)  High  Protein  (.24)  CN  (.58);  US  (.17);  HRS  (.49);  HRW  (.51); 
AU  (.14);  AR  (.11); 
20.71  mmt  (0.2  of total  Low  Protein  (.76)  DM  (.77);  US  (.18);  SRW  (l.  00) ; 
Chinese  consumption)  EC  (.05); 
Philippines  Hard  (.73)  US  (.55);  CN  (.45);  HRS  (l.00); 
l.  31  mmt  Soft  (.27)  US  (.87);  EC  (.08);  WW  (l.00); 
AU  (.03);  OTH  (.02); 
Indonesia  Hard  (.53)  CN  (.39);  AR  (.29);  HRS  (.17);  HRW  (.83); 
SA  (.17);  US  (.15); 
l.  86  mmt  Soft  (.47)  AU  (.84);  US  (.08);  WW  (l.  00) ; 
EC  (.08); 
Other  Far East  (imports)  Hard  (.73)  AU  (.44);  US  (.30);  HRS  (.77);  HRW  (.23); 
CN  (.24);  SA  (.02); 
I 
3.19  mmt  (.05 of total  Soft  (.27) 
consumption) 
EC  (.63);  US  (.37);  WW  (l.  00); 
Note:  See  notes  in Table  4. 
23 wheat  import decisions. 
For most countries/regions in the model,  the between-class 
elasticities tend to be  low  (usually about  0.50),  while the 
between-supplier elasticities tend to be higher  (usually about 
3.00).  There are  some  notable exceptions,  however.  In Japan 
policymakers value supplier diversification,  thereby  implying  a 
low substitution elasticity.  In Egypt  and Other Near East there 
is a  strong preference for white wheat  from Australia.  This 
preference  implies  a  low substitution elasticity between 
Australian wheat  and that  from  the united states and the EC.  And 
in Italy,  u.s.  and  Canadian durum wheat  do  not sUbstitute for 
each other. 
NET  BENEFITS  OF  CLEANER  WHEAT  EXPORTS 
The  u.S.  benefit of supplying cleaner wheat to  import customers 
consists of the expansion of u.S.  wheat  exports and/or the 
willingness of those customers to pay  a  price premium  for cleaner 
wheat.  At  issue is whether these benefits be great enough to 
outweigh the costs of cleaning  (about  $0.70/mt)  and the 
consequent export-decreasing effect of  a  higher export price. 
Modeling Scenarios 
In addition to providing  information useful  for specification of 
wheat  import  demand,  the surveys are a  source of how  much  demand 
for u.S.  wheat  would  change if the wheat were  cleaned prior to 
export as  indicated in table 2.  Survey results show that demand 
would  be  expected to expand  in certain "high quality" wheat 
markets constituted by the following countries:  Italy,  Brazil, 
Venezuela,  China,  Japan,  the Philippines,  Ghana,  and  Togo. 
A modeling problem is that the survey results are only applicable 
to the time period in which the survey was  taken,  that is,  spring 
and early summer  of  1992.  The  model,  on the other hand,  uses  a 
1989/90  crop year as its base.  The procedure  followed to help 
mitigate this inconsistency was  to calculate a  volume  expansion 
based on the  1989/90 base and  on the 1991/92  base.  These  two 
alternative demand  expansions present a  range over which 
importers could respond. 
It is assumed that the primary effect of  improvements  in u.S. 
wheat quality will be to increase u.S.  share at the expense of 
other exporters in those markets that are sensitive to the 
quality change.  Quality changes  are expected to have little 
impact  on global  demand  or on  individual country demand  for total 
wheat  imports.  Therefore,  in the modeling scenarios,  imports of 
wheat  from  competing exporters are reduced to offset the 
expansion of wheat  imported  from  the united States so as to leave 
24 total imports  in each  importing country the  same,  all else 
constant.  This  aspect emphasizes that u.s.  wheat  is substituting 
for wheat  from  other exporters rather than there being  a 
generalized expansion in wheat  imports  in each of these 
countries. 
The  four scenarios are: 
scenario A: 
scenario  B: 
scenario C: 
scenario 0: 
Clean all export wheat,  no  expansion in importer 
demand  for u.s.  wheat exports  (that is,  a  fixed 
import excess  demand  curve); 
Clean all export wheat,  expansion of  demand  for 
u.s.  wheat  in "high quality"  import markets; 
Expansion of demand  for u.s.  wheat  in "high 
quality"  import markets,  but clean only wheat 
going to these  "high quality"  market;  and 
Same  as  scenario  C  except that export competitors 
respond to maintain either export volume  (short 
term)  or market  share  (medium  term)  in individual 
"high quality" markets. 
Within each scenario,  there is a  short term solutions where  wheat 
production is fixed  in all countries and  a  medium  term solution 
where production adjusts to price changes.  Each  scenario also 
has  two u.s.  wheat export expansions--one based on the 1989/90 
and  one  on the  1991/92  crop year.  That is,  there are  four 
versions of each scenario except for scenario A  where there are 
only two  (short and  medium  term).  Table  9  summarizes  changes  in: 
(1)  export revenue,  (2)  cleaning costs,  and  (3)  the net benefit 
of cleaning wheat  (the difference between  (1)  and  (2».  Appendix 
table  6  shows  more detailed effects on U.S.  export prices,  wheat 
trade volume,  and export revenue.  (The  change  in export revenue 
relative to the baseline is carried over to table 9). 
Gains  from  Cleaning All  Export Wheat 
If all u.s.  wheat exports were  cleaned but there were  no u.s. 
export demand  expansion  (scenario A),  overall losses to the u.s. 
wheat  industry  (losses  in export revenue plus net costs of 
cleaning)  would  run  from  $23  million in the short term to over 
$27  million in the medium  term.  Most  of this loss comes  from the 
net costs of cleaning.  But export revenue  is affected as well, 
especially over the medium  term.  The  export price increases 
slightly  (0.07  percent)  in the short run,  and more  over the 
medium  term  (0.22  percent).  The  volume  of u.s.  wheat exports is 
reduced by about  100  thousand metric tons  (or  .3  percent)  over 
the medium  term.  There is practically no  reduction in the short 
run.  The  loss in medium  term export revenue,  therefore,  amounts 
25 Table  9  -- Net Benefits of Cleaning  O.S~  Export  Wheat 
Millions  of u.s.  Dollars 
Scenario A:  Clean all export wheat,  no  expansion  in importer  demand 
Time  Frame  Change  in Export  Costs  of Cleaning  Net  Benefit 
Revenue  Grain 
Short  term  0.27  23.47  -23.19 
Medium  term  -4.04  23.41  -27.46 
Scenario  B:  Clean all export wheat,  expansion in "high quality"  import  market 
Trade  Expansion  Based on 1989/90  Base 
Short  term  54.86  23.50  31. 36 
Medium  term  49.68  23.53  26.15 
Trade  Expansion  Based on 1991/92  Base 
Short  term  47.03  23.48  23.54 
Medium  term  45.75  23.52  22.23 
Scenario  C:  Expansion in "high quality"  import market,  clean only wheat  going 
to  "high quality"  market 
Trade  Expansion Based on  1989/90 Base 
Short  term  54.53  7.68  46.84 
Medium  term  52.60  7.71  44.89 
Trade  Expansion Based on 1991/92  Base 
Short  term  49.32  7.67  41.64 
Medium  term  48.84  7.70  41.14 
Scenario  D:  Same  as  scenario  C but export competitors  respond. 
Trade  Expansion Based on  1989/90 Base 
Short  term  29.35  7.58  21.77 
Medium  term  28.54  7.59  20.95 
Trade  Expansion Based on  1991/92  Base 
Short  term  -2.05  7.46  -9.51 
Medium  term  .98  7.47  -6.49 
26 to about  $4  million.  This scenario is the  "worst case"  scenario 
where it is assumed that no  country is willing to pay the 
additional costs of cleaning and the United States only loses 
import  customers. 
If U.S.  export demand  expanded as predicted in table  2  (scenario 
B),  export revenue  in the quality sensitive markets would 
increase sufficiently to offset the costs of cleaning and the 
losses in quality insensitive markets.  Over the short term, 
there is little effect on trade volume,  but the price rise 
amounts to about  0.9 percent.  Over the medium  term,  the total 
volume  of exports  increases between  0.14  and  0.18  percent.  (Given 
that expansion  in the quality sensitive markets  amounts  to an 
expansion of 1.5 percent,  much  of this expansion is offset by 
reduced U.S.  wheat  purchases  in the other markets.)  More 
significantly,  the export price rises by  about  0.7  percent. 
Considering the medium  term price rise when there is no  demand 
expansion,  0.22  percent  (Scenario A),  increased demand  for 
cleaner wheat  adds  slightly less than 0.5  percentage points to 
the price of export wheat. 
Given  these price and volume  changes,  along with the net costs of 
cleaning,  short term net gains are calculated in the  $23-$31 
million range,  and  medium  term gains are between  $22  and  $26 
million. 
Gains  from Selectively Cleaning Export Wheat 
One  way  to augment the gain  from  cleaning U.S.  export wheat  is to 
clean only that wheat going to those  importers that demand it and 
that are willing to pay  a  price premium  for the cleaner wheat 
(scenario C).  Results  show  a  potential gain of  $41  to  $47  million 
in the short term and  of  $41  to  $45  million over the medium  term. 
In comparison to scenario  B,  most of these heightened gains are 
attributable to lowered cleaning costs  (less wheat being 
cleaned).  Comparative export revenue gains are larger as well, 
especially over the medium  term.  The  export price rises by less, 
about  0.55 percent compared to 0.70  percent;  but trade volume 
increases by more,  0.40 percent compared to about  0.15  percent. 
There are  fewer  reduced purchases of U.S.  wheat  by  importers less 
sensitive to quality concerns. 
Scenario  C  likely overstates the gains  from selective cleaning 
because cleaning cost calculations assume all wheat  for export is 
cleaned.  As  the throughput of wheat  for cleaning declines,  costs 
per unit cleaned likely increase due to lower economies  of scale 
and  reduced savings  in domestic transport and storage.  If only 
the wheat destined to the quality sensitive markets were  cleaned, 
the net unit cost of cleaning might be expected to be higher than 
70  cents/mt.  In order to  judge the sensitivity of results to this 
27 factor,  scenario C was  rerun with net cleaning costs assumed to 
equal  $1.05,  a  50  percent increase. 
Two  effects should diminish the gain:  higher cleaning costs and 
reduced export sales because of a  higher wheat export price that 
incorporates the higher net unit cost of cleaning.  The first 
effect reduces the net benefit by about  $3.8 million,  and the 
second by  about  $0.5 million  (medium  term only).  Therefore,  the 
short term gain is between  $38  and  $43  million;  and the medium 
term gain is between  $37  and  $41  million.  Thus,  the higher 
cleaning cost only slightly reduces the gains  from  scenario C. 
Exporter Competitor Response 
Export competitors displaced by the United states may  respond by 
offering export subsidies in those markets where  they were 
displaced  (scenario  D).  If they attempt to counteract U.s. 
actions,  either the U.s.  gain is much  lower  ($22  million in the 
short term and  $21  million in the medium  term)  or there are 
relatively large losses(over $9  million in the short term and 
over  $6  million in the medium  term). 
The  only export competitor significantly harmed  by the U.s. 
cleaning is Canada.  The  top panel of table  10  shows  the reduction 
in Canadian export revenue  when  the united states selectively 
cleans export wheat  (scenario C -- 1991/92  base).  Canada  would 
stand to lose about  $25  million in the short term and  $37  million 
over the medium  term.  The  lower panel  shows  the subsidy cost to 
Canada  of regaining export volume  (short term)  and market share 
(medium  term).  In both cases,  it would  be fairly expensive:  $75 
million in the short term and  $73  million in the medium  term. 
These  amounts  are significantly higher than the export revenue 
losses they suffer.  Considered on  a  unit cost basis,  regaining 
the Italian,  Brazilian,  Venezuelan,  and  even the African markets 
would be costly.  This  outcome  suggests that retaliation by the 
Canadians  in this fashion might not be  likely,  therefore 
enhancing the possibility of a  U.s.  gain  from  selectively 
cleaning its wheat  for certain high quality markets. 
Canada  loses initially because there is a  shift in preferences 
toward U.s.  wheat.  In modeling terms,  there is a  leftward shift 
in the excess  demand  curve for Canadian wheat  in those countries 
where purchases of U.s.  wheat have  increased.  In the modeling 
scenario,  Canada  regains initial export volume  in the short run 
and market  share in the medium  run by offering export subsidies 
(or hidden price discounts)  given the shifts in excess  demand 
curves.  The  amount  of the subsidy in each market depends  on the 
elasticity of demand  for Canadian wheat:  the  lower the value of 
the elasticity,  the more costly it is to recapture the market. 
To  judge the sensitivity of these results to the elasticity 
28 Table  10  -- Effect of Cleaner o.s.  Wheat  on  Canada 
Loss  in Canadian Export  Revenue  from Scenario Benefitting the U,S.  the Most 
Scenario  Export  Price  Trade Volume  Export Revenue  Decrease  from 
Base 
(Dollar/mt)  (1000  mt)  (Million Dollars)  (Million 
Dollars) 
Base  181.00  17,045  3,085.15  -
Seen.  C  - short  179.72  17,028  3,060.33  24.82 
term 
Seen.  C  - medium  179.68  16,965  3,048.26  36.89 
term 
Subsidy Expenditure Necessary To  Regain Export Volume  (Short  Term)  and  Import 
Market  Share  (Medium  Term) 
Importer  Short Term  Unit  Vol.  of  Subsidy  Med.Term  Vol.  of  Subsidy 
Subsidy  Imports  Cost  Unit  Imports  Cost 
(Dollar/mt)  (1000  mt)  (Million  Subsidy  (1000  mt)  (Million 
Dollars)  (Dollar/mt)  Dollars) 
Italy  110.30  367  40.48  111.87  371  41. 48 
Brazil  71. 71  216  15.49  66.43  205  13.61 
Venezuela  69.35  143  9.92  66.26  135  8.96 
Japan  2.55  1,440  3.67  2.80  1,442  4.04 
China  .12  4,257  .51  .15  4,260  .64 
Philippines  1.94  433  .84  1.66  432  .72 
Ghana  38.21  75  2.87  33.63  72  2.41 
Togo  52.79  19  1.00  52.70  19  1.00 
Total  - - 74.78  - - 72.85 
issue,  additional  "scenario  CIt  and  "scenario 0"  model  runs were 
made  with a  revised model.  The  revised model  contains  own  and 
cross price elasticities of u.s.  and Canadian wheat that indicate 
greater SUbstitution possibilities between the respective wheats. 
The elasticities of SUbstitution between u.s.  hard variety wheat 
and  Canadian wheat were  increased by  50  percent in each of the 
quality-sensitive markets.  Results  show that without retaliation, 
Canada  loses  $35  million in export revenue  over the medium term. 
This  amount  compares to  $37  million in the original model.  The 
cost to Canada  of regaining market share over the medium  term is 
calculated to be  $66  million.  This  amount  compares to  $73  million 
29 in the original model.  Unless  U.S.  and  Canadian wheats  are 
perceived to be  extremely close substitutes  (which is a 
hypothesis not supported in the  importer surveys),  then complete 
retaliation  (defined in terms of regaining original market  share) 
may  not be  likely. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Quality and  the role of government policy in setting standards 
has  been  an  issue as  long as the united States has  been exporting 
grain.  This  report has  examined only one aspect of the current 
debate,  the net benefits of providing for  a  cleaner export 
product.  There are  a  number  of other quality issues  facing  U.S. 
wheat  exports,.  such as tighter control of protein content by 
class and the measurement  and  reporting of moisture content.  But 
for all the other important quality issues,  there are significant 
technical  impediments  associated with the production and 
marketing of wheat to be addressed  in addition to the economic 
feasibility questions.  The  wheat  cleaning issue is largely one 
of economics. 
The  magnitude  of the costs and benefits associated with the 
removal  of additional  dockage  from  U.S.  export wheat  is very 
small  in the scheme  of world wheat trade.  Exporting country 
governments  spend billions on  export subsidies and restitutions; 
importers,  through the  imposition of regulations and state 
trading agencies,  have greatly reduced the communication of 
quality demands  to the world market.  Quality premiums  and 
discounts are small  in a  market dominated  by pervasive government 
interference on this scale. 
Nevertheless,  there are  important quality differences  in wheat 
across exporting countries and the level of dockage  is the one 
negative attribute which most differentiates U.S.  wheat  from  the 
wheat of Canada,  Australia and Argentina.  A  few  importing 
countries reported that they would  make  small  increases in 
purchases of U.S.  wheat if it contained less dockage.  Although 
the benefits are small,  the costs are small  as well. 
This analysis has  shown that there are likely to be net gains if 
all U.S.  export wheat were to be cleaned to a  dockage  level 
between  0.35 to 0.40 percent.  Expansion  in dockage-sensitive 
wheat markets,  representing growth  in U.S.  wheat exports of about 
1.5 percent,  would  cause export revenue to grow  between  $23  and 
$31 million in the short term,  and  between  $22  and  $26  million in 
the medium  term.  Although these amounts  may  appear to be sizable, 
relative to total wheat  export  revenue,  they represent  increases 
of only about  0.5 percent.  Higher benefits are possible if only 
wheat destined to the dockage-sensitive  import markets  is cleaned 
to the desired level,  although additional  research should 
30 probably be  initiated to see if this option is feasible at 
reasonable cost levels.  Any  gain in export revenue is likely to 
be  reduced significantly if Canada decides ,to recapture the 
markets  lost to the United States.  Even  so,  this analysis has 
shown that the recapturing of lost Canadian markets  could be 
costly;  thereby reducing the probability of a  comprehensive 
Canadian  response. 
This analysis has  ignored two  considerations which  could have  a 
significant implications for the cost-benefit calculations. 
First,  we  have  only alluded to  a  change  in grades  and  standards 
which would bring about  lower level of dockage  in u.s.  wheat 
exports.  How  dockage  is incorporated into export grades  and 
standards and the speed at which the change is implemented will 
affect both the costs and benefits in the short  (and possibly the 
longl  term. 
Second,  the long term trend toward liberalization in the world 
wheat market will make  quality considerations much  more  important 
in the world market  in the next decade.  This analysis has  made 
no  attempt to speculate where  or how  the liberalization will take 
place or what the effect might be on the demand  for less dockage 
in u.s.  wheat.  These  are major changes which would affect the 
core of the purchase decision  framework  of  importing countries. 
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34 Appendix Table  1  ~- llQdelinq Parameters:  Latin America 
~  _  ... _- --- --- --
Country/  First stage  Elasticity of  own-price  Own-price  Price Trans-
Region  Second Stage  Substitution  Demand  Elas.  Supply Elas.  mission 
Elas. 
Venezuela  Hard-Soft  0.5  -0.28  - 1. 00 
US-CN  3.0  - -
US  - - -
Brazil  Preferred-Hard  0.5  -0.2  0.38  0.30 
DM-AR  1.0  - -
CN-US  3.0  - -
Mexico,  Cen.  Hard-Soft  0.5  -0.26  0.55  0.50 
Am.  & Carib.  US-CN  3.0  - -
DM-EC-US-AR  3.0  - -
Other Latin  High-Low  Prot.  0.5  -0.3  0.38  0.70 
America  US-CN  3.0  - -
DM-AR-US-EC  3.0  - -
See Table  3  for supplier codes;  Prot.  = Protein;  DM  = Domestic;  and  "_"  = not applicable 
35 Appendix Table  2  -- mModelinq  Parameters:  Europe 
~~~-.--- ... -
Country/  First stage  Elasticity  Own-price  Own-price  Price Trans-
Region  Second Stage  of  Demand  Elas.  Supply Elas.  mission 
Substitution  Elas. 
Italy  EC-Hard-Durum  0.5  -0.20  0.50  0.15 
OM-Other  - - - -
US-CN-SA  3.0  - - -
CN-US  0.5  - - -
EC  OM-Foreign  0.5  -0.37  0.50  0.15 
CN-US-SA  3.0  - - -
Other  Hard-Soft  0.5  -0.25  0.80  0.15 
Western  SA-CN-US  3.0  - - -
Europe  DM-EC  3.0  - - - J 
Former  DM-US-EC-CN-AR  3.0  -0.24  0.23  0.14 
!  Soviet Union 
Eastern  Hard-Soft  0.5  -0.28  0.25  0.40  I 
Europe  CN-AU-US  3.0  - - -
DM-EC  3.0  - - - I 
See Table  3  for supplier codes;  Prot.  = Protein;  OM  = Domestic;  and  "_"  = not applicable 
36 Appendix Table  3  -- Hodeling Parameters:  North Africa and  sub-Saharan Africa 
-
Country/  First stage  Elasticity of  Own-price  Own-price  Price Trans-
Region  Second Stage  Substitution  Demand  Elas.  Supply Elas.  mission 
Third Stage  Elas. 
Morocco  Durum-Common  0.0  -0.20  0.30  0.60 
OM-Foreign  3.0  - - -
US-EC  4.0  - - -
Tunisia  Durum-Common  0.1  -0.21  0.30  0.60 
DM-EC-US  4.0  - - -
EC-US-DM  4.0  - - -
Other North  Durum-Common  0.5  -0.20  0.30  0.60 
Africa  DM-CN-US-EC  4.0  - - -
EC-US-DM-CN  4.0  - - -
Ghana  CN-US  4.0  -0.30  - 0.40 
Togo  Hard-Soft  1.0  -0.30  - 0.40 
US-CN  2.0  - -
Other Sub- DM-Hard-Soft  3.0  -0.30  0.50  0.40 
Saharan  US-CN-SA  4.0  - - -
Africa  EC-US  4.0  - - -
See Table  3  for supplier codes;  Prot.  = Protein;  OM  = Domestic;  and  II_II  = not applicable 
37 Aooendix Table  4  -- Modelina  Parameters:  EQVDt  and west Asia 
Country/  First stage  Elasticity  Own-price  Own-price  Price Trans-
Region  Second stage  of  Demand  Elas.  Supply Elas.  mission 
Third Stage  Substitution  Elas. 
Egypt  OM-Foreign  3.0  -0.31  0.30  0.35 
AU-Other  0.5  - - -
US-EC  3.0  - - -
Pakistan  OM-Foreign  0.5  -0.30  0.40  0.25 
US-AU-EC-CN  3.0  - - -
Sri Lanka  Hard-Soft  1.0  -0.30  - 0.25 
US-SA-CN  3.0  - - -
US-EC-AU  3.0  - - -
Yemen  AU-EC-US-CN-OM  4.0  -0.30  0.30  0.60 
Other Near  Arabic-Foreign  3.0  -0.30  0.30  0.60 
East  OM-SA  3.0  - - -
AU-Other  1.0  - - -
EC-US-CN-AR  4.0  - - -
---------
See Table  3  for supplier codes;  Prot.  = Protein;  OM  = Domestic;  and  "_"  = not applicable 
38 Appendix  Table _5_ -~~odeliDCl Parameters:  Far  East  and  Rest-of-World 
--_  .. _-----_  .. - --- - --- -- --- -
Country/  First stage  Elasticity  Own-price  Own-price  Price Trans-
Region  Second Stage  of  Demand  Elas.  Supply Elas.  mission 
Substitution  Elas. 
Japan  High-Low  Qual.  0.5  -0.10  0.52  0.40 
US-CN-AU  1.0  - - -
DM-AU  1.0  - - -
Korea  High-Low  Prot.  0.5  -0.36  - 0.50 
US-CN  1.0  - - -
US-AU  1.0  - - -
Taiwan  Hard-Soft  0.5  -0.33  - 0.30 
US-CN  1.0  - - -
China  Rural-Urban  0.5  -0.30  0.15  0.15 
High-Low  Prot.  0.5  - - -
CN-US-AU-AR  3.0  - - -
DM-US-EC  3.0  - - -
Philippines  Hard-Soft  0.5  -0.30  - 0.50 
US-CN  3.0  - - -
US-CN-AU-Other  3.0  - - -
Indonesia  Hard-Soft  0.5  -0.30  - 0.25 
CN-AR-SA-US  3.0  - - -
AU-US-EC  3.0  - - -
Other Far  DM-Foreign  0.0  -0.30  0.40  0.60 
East  Hard-Soft  0.5  - - -
AU-US-CN-SA  3.0  - - -
EC-US  1.0  - - -
I  Rest-of- US-EC-AU-SA- 3.0  -0.30  - 0.00 
I  World  Other 
I 
See Table  3  for supplier codes;  Prot.  = Protein;  DM  = Domestic;  and  "_"  = not applicable 
39 Appendix  Table  6  -- Model  Results  tor u.S.  Wheat  Trade 
Scenario  Description  Price  Export  Export 
Volume  Revenue 
(Do11ar/mt)  (1000  mt)  (Million 
Dollars) 
Base  162.0000  33549  5434.938 
Scenario  A  Short  term  162.1145  33527  5435.213 
Medium  term  162.3635  33449  5430.897 
Scenario  B  1989/90 base 
Short  term  163.5378  33569  5489.800 
Medium  term  163.1792  33611  5484.616 
1991/92  base 
Short  term  163.4018  33549  548l.967 
Medium  term  163.1206  33599  5480.689 
Scenario  C  1989/90 base 
Short  term  163.4499  33585  5489.465 
Medium  term  162.9026  33686  5487.537 
1991/92 base 
Short  term  163.3142  33581  5484.254 
Medium  term  162.8442  33675  5483.778 
Scenario D  1989/90 base 
Short  term  162.7923  33566  5464.286 
Medium  term  162.5358  33614  5463.478 
1991/92 base  161.9727  33542  5432.888 
Short  term 










October  1,  1993 
INTERNATIONAL  AGRICULTURAL  TRADE  RESEARCH  CONSORTIUM* 
Working  Papers  Series 
Title 
Do  Macroeconomic  Variables 
Affect  the  Ag  Trade 
Sector?  An  Elasticities 
Analysis 
Basic  Economics  of an 
Export  Bonus  Scheme 
Risk Aversion  in a  Dynamic 
Trading  Game 
An  Econometric  Model  of 
the  European  Economic 
Community's  Wheat  Sector 
Targeted Ag  Export 
Subsidies  and Social 
Welfare 
Optimum  Tariffs  in a 
Distorted Economy:  An 
Application to  U.S. 
Agriculture 
Estimating Gains  from  Less 
Distorted Ag  Trade 
Comparative Advantage, 
Competitive Advantage,  and 
U.S.  Agricultural Trade 
Author(s) 
McCalla,  Alex 
Pick,  Daniel 
Houck,  James 
Karp,  Larry 
de  Gorter,  Harry 
Meilke,  Karl 
Abbott,  Philip 
Paarlberg,  Philip 
Sharples,  Jerry 
Karp,  Larry 
Beghin,  John 
Sharples,  Jerry 
White,  Kelley 
Send  correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr  Alex  McCalla 
Dept  of Ag  Econ 
U of California 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  James  Houck 
Dept  of Ag  Econ 
U of Minnesota 
St  Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Larry  Karp 
Dept  of Ag  & Resource 
Econ/U  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr  Karl  Meilke 
Dept  of Ag  Econ 
U of Guelph 
Guelph,  Ontario 
CANADA  NlJ  ISl 
Dr  Philip Abbott 
Dept  of Ag  Econ 
Purdue  University 
W Lafayette,  IN  47907 
Dr  Larry  Karp 
Dept  of Ag  & Resource 
Econ/U  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr  Jerry Sharples 
USDA/ERS/IED/ETP 
628f  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr  Kelley  White 
USDA/ERS/IED 
732  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York Ave  NW 











on  Farm  Support  Levels: 
The  Role  of  PSEs 
The  Effect of Protection 
and  Exchange  Rate  Policies 
on Agricultural Trade: 
Implications  for Argentina, 
Brazil,  and Mexico 
Deficits  and Agriculture: 
An  Alternative  Parable 
An  Analysis  of Canadian 
Demand  for  Imported 
Tomatoes:  One  Market  or 
Many? 
Japanese  Beef Policy  and 
GATT  Negotiations:  An 
Analysis  of Reducing 
Assistance  to  Beef  Producers 
Grain Markets  and  the 
United States:  Trade  Wars, 
Export  Subsidies,  and 
Price Rivalry 
Agricultural Trade 
Liberalization in a 
Multi-Sector World 
Model 
Developing  Country 
Agriculture  in the  Uruguay 
Round:  What  the  North 
Might Miss 
Author(s) 
Tangermann,  Stefan 
Josling,  Tim 
Pearson,  Scott 
Krissoff,  Barry 
Ballenger,  Nicole 
Just,  Richard 
Chambers,  Robert 
Send  correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr  Tim  Josling 
Food  Research  Institute 
Stanford University 
Stanford,  CA  94305 
Dr  Barry Krissoff 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
624  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr  Robert  Chambers 
Dept  of Ag  & Resource 
Economics 
Univ  of Maryland 
College  Park,  MD  20742 
Darko-Mensah,  Kwame 
Prentice,  Barry 
Dr  Barry  Prentice 
Dept  of Ag  Econ  & 
Wahl,  Thomas 
Hayes,  Dermot 
Williams,  Gary 
Houck,  James 
Krissoff,  Barry 
Ballenger,  Nicole 
Mabbs-Zeno,  Carl 
Ballenger,  Nicole 
Farm  Mgmt 
University of Manitoba 
Winnipeg,  Manitoba 
CANADA  R3T  2N2 
Dr  Dermot  Hayes 
Dept  of Economics 
Meat  Export  Research 
Center 
Iowa  State University 
Ames,  IA  soon 
Dr  James  Houck 
Dept  of Ag  Econ 
Univ  of Minnesota 
St  Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Barry Krissoff 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
624  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr  Nicole  Ballenger 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
624  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW 











Two-Stage  Agricultural 
Import  Demand  Models 
Theory  and Applications 
Determinants  of U.S. 
Wheat  Producer  Support 
Price:  A Time  Series 
Analysis 
Effect of Sugar  Price 
Policy  on U.S.  Imports 
of Processed Sugar-
containing  Foods 
Market  Effects  of 
In-Kind Subsidies 
A Comparison of Tariffs 
and Quotas  in a 
Strategic Setting 
Targeted and  Global 
Export  Subsidies  and 
Welfare  Impacts 
Who  Determines  Farm 
Programs?  Agribusiness 
and  the  Making  of Farm 
Policy 
Report  of  ESCOP  Subcom-
mittee  on Domestic  and 
International Markets 
and Policy 
Does  Arbitraging Matter? 




Carter,  Colin 
Green,  Richard 
Pick,  Daniel 
von Witzke,  Harald 
Jabara,  Cathy 
Houck,  James 
Karp,  Larry 
Bohman,  Mary 
Carter,  Colin 
Dortman,  Jeffrey 
Alston,  Julian 
Carter,  Colin 
wp.olgenant,  M. 
Abbott,  P.C. 
Johnson,  D.G. 
Johnson,  R.S. 
Meyers,  W.H. 
Rossmiller,  G.E. 
White,  T.K. 
McCalla,  A. F. 
Anania,  Giovanni 
McCalla,  Alex 
Send  correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr  Colin Carter 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
Univ of California 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Harald von Witzke 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
Univ  of Minnesota 
St  Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Cathy Jabara 
Office  of  Econ  Policy 
U.S.  Treasury  Dept 
15th & Pennsylvania  Ave  NW 
Washington,  DC  20220 
Dr  James  Houck 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
University of Minnesota 
St  Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Larry Karp 
Dept  of Ag  & Resource 
Econ/U  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr  Colin Carter 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
U of California,  Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Colin Carter 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
U of California,  Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Alex  McCalla 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
U of California-Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Alex McCalla 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
U of California-Davis 











Export  Supply  and  Import 
Demand  Elasticities in the 
Japanese Textile  Industry: 
A Production Theory Approach 
The  Welfare  Effects  of 
Imperfect Harmonization of 
Trade  and Industrial  Policy 
Report  of the  Task  Force 
on Tariffication and 
Rebalancing 
Report  of  the  Task  Force 
on Reinstrumentation of 
Agricultural  Policies 
Report  of the  Task  Force 
on  The  Aggregate  Measure 
of Support:  Potential Use 
by  GATT  for Agriculture 
Agricultural  Policy 
Adjustments  in East Asia: 
The  Korean  Rice  Economy 
Background  Papers  for 
Report  of the  Task  Force 
on  The  Aggregate  Measure 
of Support:  Potential 
Use  by  GATT  for Agriculture 
Optimal  Trade  Policies 
for  a  Developing  Country 
Under Uncertainty 
Report  of  the  Task  Force 
on  The  Comprehensive 
Proposals  for Negotiations 
in Agriculture 
Author(s) 
Pick,  Daniel 
Park,  Timothy 
Gatsios,  K. 
Karp,  Larry 
Josling,  Tim 
Chair 
Magiera,  Stephen 
Chair 
Rossmiller,  G.E. 
Chair 
Kwon,  Yong  Dae 
Yamauchi,  Hiroshi 
Rossmiller,  G.E. 
Chair 
Choi,  E.  Kwan 
Lapan,  Harvey  E. 
Josling,  Tim 
Chair 
Send  correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Daniel  Pick 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York  Ave.  N.W. 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr.  Larry  Karp 
Dept.  of Ag  & Resource 
Econ/U  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr.  Timothy Josling 
Food  Research  Institute 
Stanford University 
Stanford,  CA  94305-6084 
Stephen  L.  Magiera 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York  Ave.,  Rm  624 
Washington,  D.C.  20005-4788 
Dr.  G.  Edward  Rossmiller 
Resources  for  the  Future 
Nat'l  Ctr  for  Food/Ag  Policy 
1616  P  Street N.W. 
Washington,  D.C.  20036 
Dr.  Hiroshi  Yamauchi 
Dept.  of Ag  & Res.  Econ. 
University of Hawaii 
3050  Maile  Way 
Gilmore  Hall 
Honolulu,  Hawaii  96822 
Dr.  G.  Edward  Rossmiller 
Resources  for  the  Future 
Nat'l Ctr  for  Food/Ag  Policy 
1616  P  Street N.W. 
Washington,  D.C.  20036 
Dr.  E.  Kwan  Choi 
Dept.  of Economics 
Iowa  State University 
Ames,  Iowa  50011 
Dr.  Timothy Josling 
Food  Research  Institute 
Stanford University 










Uncertainty,  Price 
Stabilization & Welfare 
Politically Acceptable 
Trade  Compromises  Between 
The  EC  and The  US:  A 
Game  Theory  Approach 
Agricultural  Policies 
and  the  GATT:  Recon~iling 
Protection,  Support  and 
Distortion 
Report  of  the  Task  Force 
on  Reviving  the  GATT 
Negotiations  in Agriculture 
Economic  Impacts  of  the 
U.S.  Honey  Support  Program 
on  the  Canadian Honey  Trade 
and  Producer  Prices 
U.S.  Export  Subsidies  in 
Wheat:  Strategic Trade 
Policy or  an  Expensive 
Beggar-My-Neighbor Tatic? 
The  Impact  of Real 
Exchange  Rate  Misalignment 
and Instability on 
Macroeconomic  Performance 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Global  Grain  Stocks  and 
World  Market  Stability 
Revisited 
Author(s) 
Choi,  E.  Ewan 
Johnson,  Stanley 
Johnson,  Martin 
Mahe,  Louis 
Roe,  Terry 
de  Gorter,  Harry 
Harvey,  David R. 
Trade  Update  Notes 
Prentice,  Barry 
Darko,  Kwame 
Anania,  Giovanni 
Bohman,  Mary 
Colin,  Carter A. 
Ghura,  Dhaneshwar 
Grennes,  Thomas  J. 
Martinez,  Steve 
Sharples,  Jerry 
Send  correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr.  E.  Kwan  Choi 
Dept.  of  Economics 
Iowa  State University 
Ames,  IA  500ll 
Dr.  Terry  Roe 
Dept.  of Ag  & Applied  Econ 
1994  Buford Avenue 
University of Minnesota 
St.  Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr.  Harry  de  Gorter 
Dept.  of  Ag  Economics 
Cornell University 
Ithaca,  NY  14853 
Dr.  Maury  E.  Bredahl 
Center  for  International 
Trade  Expansion 
200  Mumford  Hall 
Missouri University 
Columbia,  MO  65211 
Dr.  Barry  E.  Prentice 
University of Manitoba 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
& Farm  Management 
Winnipeg,  Manitoba 
R3T  2N2  CANADA 
Dr.  Colin Carter 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
Univ.  California-Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr.  Thomas  J.  Grennes 
Dept  of  Economics 
& Business 
North Carolina State Univ 
P.O.  Box  8109 
Raleigh,  NC  27695-8109 
Steve Martinez 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York Ave  NW 
Room  624 










The  Export  Enhancement 
Program:  Prospects  Under 
the  Food,  Agriculture, 
Conservation,  and Trade 
Act  of 1990 
European  Economic 
Integration and  the 
Consequences  for  U.S. 
Agriculture 
Agricultural  Policymaking 
in Germany:  Implications 
for  the  German  Position 
in Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations 
Partial Reform  of World 
Rice  Trade:  Implications 
for  the  U.S.  Rice  Sector 
A Simple  Measure  for 
Agricultural Trade 
Distortion 
Estimated Impacts  of  a 
Potential U.S.-Mexico 
Preferential Trading 
Agreement  for  the 
Agricultural Sector 
Assessing Model 
Assumptions  in Trade 
Liberalization Modeling: 
An  Application to  SWOMPSIM 
Whither  European  Community 
Common  Agricultural Policy, 
MacSharried,  or Dunkeled 
in the  GATT? 
Author(s) 
Haley,  Stephen  L. 
Gleckler,  James 
Koopman,  Bob 
Tweeten,  Luther 
Send correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr.  Stephen  L.  Haley 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
& Agribusiness 
Louisiana State University 
101  Ag  Admin  Bldg 
Baton  Rouge,  LA  70803-5604 
Luther  Tweeten 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
& Rural  Sociology 
Ohio  State University 
2120  Fyffe  Road 
Columbus,  OH  43210-1099 
Tangermann,  Stefan David  Kelch 
Kelch,  David  ATAD/ERS/USDA 
Haley,  Stephen 
Roningen,  Vernon 
Dixit,  Praveen M. 
Krissoff,  Barry 
Neff,  Liana 
Sharples,  Jerry 
Herlihy,  Micheal 
Haley,  Stephen L. 
Johnston,  Brian 
Roningen,  Vernon 
1301  New  York  Ave  Nw-624 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Stephen L.  Haley 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
& Agribusiness 
Louisiana State University 
101  Ag  Administration  Bldg 
Baton Rouge,  LA  70803 
Vernon  O.  Roningen 
ATAD/ERS/USDA 
1301  New  York  Ave  Nw-624 
washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Barry Krissoff 
ATAD/ERS/USDA 
1301  New  York  Ave  Nw-734 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Stephen Haley 
Louisiana State University 
Dept  AgEc  & Agribusiness 
101  Administration  Bldg 
Baton Rouge,  LA  70803 
Vernon  O.  Roningen 
ATAD/ERS/USDA 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW-624 











A Critique of Computable 
General  Equilibrium Models 
for  Trade  Policy Analysis 
Agricultural Trade 
Liberalization: 
Implications  for  Productive 
Factors  in the  U.S. 
Implementing  a  New  Trade 
Paradigm:  Opportunities 
for Agricultural Trade 
Regionalism  in the 
Pacific Rim 
The  Treatment of National 
Agricultural Policies  in 
Free  Trade  Areas 
Shifts  in Eastern German 
Production Structure Under 
Market  Forces 
The  Evolving  Farm  Structure 
in Eastern Germany 
MacSherry  or Dunkel:  Which 
Plan Reforms  the  CAP? 
Agricultural  and Trade 
Deregulation in New  Zealand: 
Lessons  for  Europe  and  the 
CAP 
Testing Dynamic 
Specification for  Import 
Demand  Models:  The  Case 
of Cotton 
Author(s) 
Hazledine,  Tim 
Liapis,  Peter 
Shane,  Mathew 
Tweeten,  Luther 
Lin,  Chin-Zen 
Gleckler,  James 
Rask,  Norman 
Josling,  Tim 
Send  correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Tim  Hazledine 
Bureau of Competition 
Policy  - 20th  Floor 
Economic  & Intl Affairs 
Place  du  Po·rtage 
I  50  Victoria Street 
Hull,  Quebec 
CANADA  K1A  OC9 
Peter  S.  Liapis 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW-624 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Luther  Tweeten 
Ohio  State University 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
2120  Fyffe  Rd 
Columbus,  OH  43210-1099 
Tim  Josling 
Stanford University 
Food  Research  Institute 
Stanford,  CA  94305 
Paarlberg,  Philip  Philip  L.  Paarlberg 
Purdue University 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
Krannert  Bldg 
West  Lafayette,  IN  47907 
Paarlberg,  Philip  Philip  L.  Paarlberg 
Purdue  University 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
Krannert  Bldg 
Josling,  Tim 
Tangermann,  Stefan 
Gibson,  Jim 
Hillman,  Jimmye 
Josling,  Timothy 
Lattimore,  Ralph 
Stumme,  Dorothy 
Arnade,  Carlos 
Pick,  Daniel 
Vasavada,  Utpal 
West  Lafayette,  IN  47907 
Tim  Josling 
Stanford University 
Food  Research  Institute 
Stanford,  CA  94305 
Jimmye  Hillman 
University of Arizona 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
Tucson,  AZ  85721 
Dr.  Daniel  Pick 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW-#734 










Environmental  & Agricultural 
Policy Linkages  in the 
European  Community:  The 
Nitrate  Problem  and  Cap 
Reform 
International Trade  in 
Forest  Products:  An 
Overview 
Measuring  Protection in 
Agriculture:  The  Producer 
Subsidy  Equivalent 
Revisited 
Phasing  In and  Phasing  Out 
Protectionism with  Costly 
Adjustment  of Labour 
Domestic  and Trade  Policy 
for  Central  and  East 
European Agriculture 
Evaluation of External 
Market  Effects  & Government 
Intervention in Malaysia's 
Agricultural Sector:  A 
Computable  General 
Equilibrium  Framework 
Wheat  Cleaning & Its Effect 
on U.S.  Wheat  Exports 
Author(s) 
Haley,  Stephen 
Puttock,  G.  David 
Sabourin,  Marc 
Meilke,  Karl  D. 
Masters,  William 
Karp,  Larry 
Thierry,  Paul 
Karp,  Larry 
Spiro,  Stefanou 
Yeah,  Kim  Leng 
Yanagida,  John 
Yamauchi,  Hiroshi 
Haley,  Stephen L. 
Leetmaa,  Susan 
Webb,  Alan 
Send  correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Stephen  L.  Haley 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW-#740 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
David  Puttock 
Faculty of Forestry 
University of Toronto 
33  Willcocks  St 
Toronto,  Ontario 
CANADA  M5S  3B3 
William  A.  Masters 
Purdue  University 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
West  Lafayette,  IN  47907 
Larry  Karp 
Univ  of Calif-Berkeley 
Ag  and  Resource  Economics 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Larry Karp 
Univ  of Calif-Berkeley 
Ag  and Resource  Economics 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Hiroshi  Yamauchi 
University of Hawaii 
Dept  of Ag  & Resource  Econ 
3050  Maile  Way-Gilmore  104 
Honolulu,  HI  96822 
Stephen L.  Haley 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW-#740 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
*The  International Agricultural Trade  Research  Consortium  is  an  informal 
association of university and  government  economists  interested in agricultural 
trade.  Its purpose  is to  foster  interaction,  improve  research capacity and  to 
focus  on relevant trade policy issues.  It is  financed by  the  USDA,  ERS  and  FAS, 
Agriculture  Canada  and  the participating institutions. The  IATRC  Working  Paper  Series  provides  members  an opportunity  to  circulate  their 
work at  the  advanced draft stage  through  limited distribution within  the  research 
and  analysis  community.  The  IATRC  takes  no  political positions  or responsibility 
for  the  accuracy of  the  data or validity of  the  conclusions  presented by  working 
paper  authors.  Further,  policy  recommendations  and  opinions  expressed by  the 
authors  do  not necessarily reflect those  of  the  IATRC. 
Correspondence  or requests  for  copies  of working papers  should be  addressed  to  the 
authors  at the  addresses  listed above. 
A current list of  IATRC  publications  is available  from: 
Laura  Bipes,  Administrative  Director 
Department  of Agricultural & Applied  Economics 
University of Minnesota 
23lg  Classroom Office  Building 
1994  Buford Ave 
St.  Paul,  MN  55108-6040 
U.S.A. 